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The Low Area Probing Detector as a
Countermeasure Against Invasive Attacks
Michael Weiner , Salvador Manich, Rosa Rodríguez-Montañés, and Georg Sigl
Abstract— Microprobing allows intercepting data from on-
chip wires as well as injecting faults into data or control
lines. This makes it a commonly used attack technique against
security-related semiconductors, such as smart card controllers.
We present the low area probing detector (LAPD) as an efficient
approach to detect microprobing. It compares delay differences
between symmetric lines such as bus lines to detect timing
asymmetries introduced by the capacitive load of a probe.
Compared with state-of-the-art microprobing countermeasures
from industry, such as shields or bus encryption, the area
overhead is minimal and no delays are introduced; in contrast
to probing detection schemes from academia, such as the probe
attempt detector, no analog circuitry is needed. We show the
Monte Carlo simulation results of mismatch variations as well as
process, voltage, and temperature corners on a 65-nm technology
and present a simple reliability optimization. Eventually, we show
that the detection of state-of-the-art commercial microprobes is
possible even under extreme conditions and the margin with
respect to false positives is sufficient.
Index Terms— Data buses, digital integrated circuits, invasive
attacks, microprobing, security, smart cards.
I. INTRODUCTION
SEMICONDUCTORS have been used in security appli-cations for more than 30 years. Their first applications
were in public telephones where they served as payment cards,
as well as in pay TV where they were required to decrypt video
signals. As such, security relevant semiconductors were most
frequently embedded into plastic cards, the term “Smart Card”
was coined for such cards with an embedded semiconductor.
Three decades ago, when the first Smart Cards appeared,
so did attacks against them. In the simplest case, their purpose
could have been preventing to debit balance from phone cards,
while more sophisticated attacks already aimed at full dumps
to reveal algorithms and keys of cryptographic primitives.
The methods used were quite simple in the beginning.
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Debiting balance could be prevented by disconnecting the pro-
gramming voltage; read only memory dumps were possible,
for example, using glitching [1].
In the meantime, a circle of novel attacks and counter-
measures has significantly improved the attack resistance of
today’s security microcontrollers. Glitch detectors as well
as temperature and light sensors were added to detect fault
attacks. When side channel attacks came up, massive efforts
were spent on modeling and reducing the leakage at different
abstraction layers. Today, the most sophisticated attacks of
this kind appear to be localized electromagnetic attacks [2];
recent publications [3], [4] have presented detectors of these
attacks.
In 2010, Tarnovsky was able to carry out a full memory
dump of a smart card controller by microprobing the bus [5].
This was successful in spite of its protective mesh. In the
following years, industry and academia have been working
on countermeasures against microprobing. Masking schemes
were implemented to make probing single lines worthless [6];
circuits dedicated to the detection of microprobes based on
their parasitic capacitance have been proposed [7], [8] and
also other circuits proposed in academia that can detect
microprobes as a side effect [9].
We have presented the concept of a low area probing
detector (LAPD) [8] that only consists of a few gates and
therefore keeps the area and power overhead low. In this
paper, we demonstrate its reliability with respect to process
variations and varying environmental conditions and give
recommendations how to increase the reliability beyond its
intrinsic limits.
Section II will describe microprobing and its countermea-
sures in more detail. Section III will give a brief description
of the LAPD and show how it can be integrated into a bus
system. The results and discussion of reliability are presented
in Section IV; furthermore, this section explains how its
reliability can be improved. Section V presents future work
and this paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The bus of a smart card controller is a highly desirable
attack target for microprobing. It concentrates the information
transferred between CPU core, memory, and peripherals in a
small area; this includes sensitive data such as the controller
firmware or cryptographic keys. While it is physically difficult
to probe all lines of a bus at the same time, adversaries have
been iteratively probing one line of a bus after another; the
acquired data are then accumulated in a later step.
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A. State of the Art
State-of-the-art microprobing protection in smartcard con-
trollers can be classified into three categories. One can either
devalue the outcome of probing, e.g., by using bus encryp-
tion or masking, one can obstruct physical access to target
lines, or one can detect inherent effects of probes.
Ishai et al. [10] apply multiparty computation techniques
to mask signals; however, the circuit complexity increases
by O(n2) in the general case for protecting against prob-
ing n lines simultaneously. The authors themselves put the
practicability of their approach in question. Furthermore,
protection against fault injection would require additional
complexity.
On the industry side, redundant cores combined with bus
encryption can provide protection against targeted fault injec-
tion and void the value of probed signals. While this approach
provides a generic protection against faults and information
leakage and is implemented by a major semiconductor man-
ufacturer in their flagship smartcard controllers, the large
hardware overhead might not be suitable for low-cost high-
volume products such as subscriber identity module cards.
In addition, the introduced delay and power consumption
may complicate their use in low-latency and ultralow power
applications.
Obstructing access to target lines can be done in a pas-
sive way, e.g., by metal fillings or passive shields, or by
active shields. Passive shields can be removed by focused
ion beam (FIB) machines. Active shields usually drive
test patterns through a mesh on the top layer and verify
that the patterns reach the other ends of the mesh lines.
Cioranesco et al. suggested to use cryptographic PRNGs to
provide a large number of unpredictable test signals [11].
However, this comes with an increased hardware cost, and
it can likely be circumvented by adding bypass lines on top
of the passivation layer using an FIB.
Other approaches try to bury security critical signals under-
neath other functional, but noncritical lines. Shi et al. present
an algorithm to determine the exposure of critical lines [12].
Still, this does not appear as the overall solution: the zero
exposure of target lines is hard to reach, especially if designers
want to avoid multiple layout iterations, which is critical for
fast time-to-market. Also, bypassing cut lines above the top
layer is still feasible for an attacker.
All of the described countermeasures do not protect against
probing attacks from the backside. This vulnerability can
be avoided if the inherent effects of invasive attacks such
as probing are detected, as it can be done by observing
the capacitive load of a probe. That way, probing can be
detected no matter whether extensive FIB editing was used
to uncover target lines, or whether a probe was connected on
the back side. The only approach that detects such attacks
and that has been evaluated with respect to process, voltage,
and temperature variation is the probe attempt detector (PAD)
by Manich et al. [7] whose principle of operation is briefly
described in Section II-B. However, the necessity of a large
tank capacitor that needs to be charged and discharged still
comes with an area, power, and timing overhead that pre-
vents it from being used in ultralow resource applications.
Fig. 1. PAD overview.
Fig. 2. PAD detector circuit.
Also, it does not allow its implementation in programmable
logic platforms like field-programmable gate arrays.
Please note that in addition to invasive attacks, there exist
semi-invasive attacks that do not require electrical contacts
to the chip, as classified by Skorobogatov [13]. Localized
electromagnetic attacks [2] are an example for semi-invasive
attacks. Such attacks can be detected by other types of
detectors, as for example presented by Homma et al. [3], [4].
However, these attacks are specialized to a certain target,
e.g., to the extraction of cryptographic keys by the means of
correlation attacks [14], and they are usually the wrong tool
for an attacker to create a complete memory dump. There-
fore, we consider protection against semi-invasive attacks as
orthogonal to protection against invasive attacks, and we do
not consider them here any further.
B. Probe Attempt Detector
The PAD was proposed in [7] and is the first technique
detecting physical attacks in buses by measuring the modifi-
cation of parasitics provoked in the lines.
In Fig. 1, an overview of the detector is shown. The PAD
runs in off-line mode and when started, a periodic signal is
sent simultaneously through all the lines. At the outputs, XOR
gates compare the state of the lines and if transitions arrive
with different propagation delays, and they generate pulses of
a width proportional to the delay difference. A downstream
circuitry adds all these pulses, integrates over time, and
generates a digital alert symptom. Because of the differential
mode, the response of the PAD does not depend on the number
of buffers inserted in the bus lines.
In Fig. 2, a simplified model of the downstream circuitry is
shown. A tank capacitor CT with the initial charge CT VDD is
gradually discharged by the pulses coming from the XOR gates.
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Fig. 3. Schematic of the LAPD.
When the pulses arrive, they switch ON nMOS transistors,
which in turn extract some charge from CT through a current
source; therefore, the amount of charge discharged from the
capacitor is proportional to the “active” time of the nMOS
transistors. Initially, when the detector starts, CT is charged
to the maximum voltage VDD through a switch S. Then,
the switch is opened and the XOR gates start comparing signals
coming from the bus during a given integration time. If the
arrival times of the XOR inputs are mutually delayed by a
probe, the XOR gates generate pulses accordingly, which in
turn gradually discharge the capacitor. A comparator CP raises
its output when the voltage vC goes below the threshold Vref .
A probing attack alert is activated when this signal is raised
earlier than normal.
C. Limitations of Previous Work
What we consider missing is a low-cost detection circuitry
for state-of-the-art invasive attacks that can, on the one hand,
support the security of high-end smartcard controllers, but on
the other hand is also able to increase the attack barrier for
mass-produced low-cost devices. The concept of an LAPD by
Weiner et al. [8] fills this gap; here, we provide a detailed
analysis of the LAPD including a reliability analysis with
respect to manufacturing variations and varying environmental
conditions.
III. LOW AREA PROBING DETECTOR
A microprobe attached to a line on a semiconductor acts as
a small parasitic capacitance; this increases the rise and fall
times of the transmitted signals. Considering a set of lines
that are symmetric with respect to dimensions and timing,
probing one of the lines introduces a small timing asymmetry
between the probed line and the unprobed lines. The LAPD [8]
can measure such timing differences and raise an alarm if
they are beyond normal noise or manufacturing variations.
This increases the complexity of a microprobing attack. If n
lines are protected by the LAPD, n − 1 microprobes can be
detected such that the adversary would need to attach the
same capacitive load to all n protected lines. We assume this
to be an effective countermeasure against practical probing
attacks, as the space for micropositioners on a probe station is
limited and the measurement setup becomes more and more
fragile with each additional probe. Tarnovsky [5], for example,
preferred using only two probes for a successful attack, even
though this implied a significant postprocessing overhead.
The LAPD performs pairwise comparisons, so
Sections III-A and III-B will focus on the case of two
lines. Section III-C will then show how a set of n lines can
be protected.
A. Principle of Operation
The LAPD compares the delays of two lines by alternatingly
introducing an intentional delay tD to each one of the lines
and then verifying that the delayed line is effectively slower
than the line without intentional delay.
In Fig. 3, the full circuit is shown. In Fig. 3, bold letters rep-
resent gate instances, typewriter letters represent line names,
and italic letters represent capacitances. The different stages
of the LAPD are indicated by dotted squares.
The signal source S in stage 1 generates test pulses that
are fed to the lines under tests L1 and L2. In stage 3,
a combination of multiplexers M and delay elements T of
delay tD allows alternately delaying one of the lines at a time
through signal sel. Finally, the arbiter in stage 4, which
consists of gates N, decides who “wins” the race. Under
normal conditions, both lines “win” alternately; however, one
line is always winning if an imbalance of more than tD
is introduced by a probe. For signal values sel = 0/1,
the output Q produces Q1/Q2, respectively, as described in
Section III-B.
In our case, an NOR RS latch is used as an arbiter. In one
test cycle, both latch inputs are first set to the active state (1);
after that, both inputs change to the inactive state (0). After
the transition, the output is determined by the input signal that
had been active for longer. If the R input remains active longer
than the S input, Q becomes 0 and vice versa.
The complete LAPD timing is shown in Fig. 4. It shows two
test cycles. In the first cycle, L2 is delayed by element T2,
while L1 is directly passed through; in the second cycle,
the delay introduced by element T1 is applied to L1, while
L2 is directly passed through. Fig. 4(a) shows the default case
in which both lines have an equal capacitance. In this case,
the latch output Q alternates between Q1 = 1 and Q2 = 0 at
the two sampling times shown (red vertical lines). The case in
which an attached probe introduces an additional delay to L1
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Fig. 4. LAPD timing. (a) Without probing. (b) With probing of L1.
is shown in Fig. 4(b). Here, the R input dominates the latch at
both sampling times and the output Q is Q1 = 0 and Q2 = 0
in both the cases. Note that when both latch inputs R and S
are simultaneously high, both latch outputs Q and Q are low,
and thus the state of the latch is invalid. This is denoted by X
in the timing diagrams.
B. LAPD Model
In order to compare the delay between two lines, we assume
that both have an intrinsic parasitic capacitance of CL . In addi-
tion, a microprobe with a parasitic capacitance CA is attached
to one of the lines. As a result, the effective capacitances of
the lines during the attack are
probed: C1 = CL + CA (1)
unprobed: C2 = CL . (2)
The line driver delay can be estimated using the alpha-power
model for the transistors [15], [16]
di = k˜ Ci VDD
(VDD − Vt )α (3)
where Ci is the capacitive load at the buffer output and
VDD denotes the supply voltage. Vt is the threshold voltage
of the transistors, α represents the velocity saturation coef-
ficient of the carriers, and k˜ is called the trans-resistance
that summarizes the remaining transistor parameters [17].
We assume that the technological parameters between nMOS
and pMOS transistors are balanced with respect to the output
transition times. Furthermore, we assume that the signals in
the lines exhibit the full swing between GND and VDD for (3);
otherwise, the approximation would significantly deviate from
the real behavior. This last assumption is quite reasonable,
since an attack will always try to disturb the observed signals
as little as possible.
Then, the delay difference between the probed and the
unprobed lines is
tL1,L2 = d2 − d1 = k˜ (C2 − C1)VDD
(VDD − Vt )α = − CA (4)
with the technological parameter
 = k˜ VDD
(VDD − Vt )α . (5)
In a first approximation, the delay difference is proportional
to the attack capacitance CA , as shown in (4). The alpha model
approach works better for small values of CA. State-of-the-art
semiconductor microprobes, as, for example, offered by GGB
Industries, Inc. [18], [19], have parasitic capacitances in the
range of tens of femtofarads and therefore can be assumed
to be small enough for the approximation. Microprobes with
a larger CA may disturb regular operation of the circuit
and thus not be suitable for successful microprobing attacks;
furthermore, the delay function is also monotonic outside
the boundaries of the small-value approximation of (4), and
therefore a reliable LAPD operation can be expected.
After the bus, the Dout inverters increase the slew rate to
minimize the effects of different switching thresholds of the
multiplexers M. Dout also scales the delay difference
tL1,L2 = kDout · tL1,L2 (6)
where tL1,L2 is the delay difference observed after the Dout
inverters.
After the Dout inverters, the transitions pass through T
and M before they reach the RS latch; therefore, the delay
difference at the latch inputs can be expressed as follows:
tRS = tL1,L2 ± tD + (tM2 − tM1) (7)
tD is the delay introduced by the delay element T. In the two
cycles shown in Fig. 4, it is alternated between the R and
S inputs of the latch. As (1) and (2) assume that the attack
capacitance CA is attached to L1, i.e., the R path of the latch,
it is sufficient to concentrate on the case where tD only affects
the S path, i.e., the first cycle of Fig. 4.
The difference (tM2 − tM1) models the imbalances of the
multiplexers M due to different slew rates at the input.
Inserting (4) and (6) into (7) and focusing on the first cycle,
it follows:
tRS = −kDout · CA + tD + tM2 − tM1. (8)
The latch needs to have a minimum distance between the
falling edges to produce a reliable output; this distance can be
compared with the hold time of a flipflop. Therefore
|tRS| > tH (9)
holds, where tH is the “hold time” of the latch.
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Fig. 5. LAPD integration into tristate bus.
Inserting (8) into (9), one can get the two cases
CA <
tD + tM2 − tM1 − tH
 kDout
(10)
CA >
tD + tM2 − tM1 + tH
 kDout
(11)
where (10) refers to the case that reliably does not raise an
alarm, and (11) denotes the case that does raise an alarm
reliably.
C. System Integration
The LAPD by itself can only protect two lines. In order
to extend its protection to buses with n lines, one can use
switching elements to connect two lines to the LAPD at a time
and then cycle through different pairs. Alternatively, the low
area of the LAPD allows us to insert n LAPD instances, which
avoids additional noise introduced by switching elements and
allows performing parallel evaluation of multiple lines.
To protect a bus, the LAPD can be surrounded by a state
machine that requests low level bus access applying direct
memory accesslike concepts; in this case, it can be connected
like a peripheral component. The LAPD can be split up into
a “source” part consisting of components S and Din that acts
as a bus master and an evaluation part consisting of Dout, M,
T, and N.
As an example, the LAPD can be integrated into a tris-
tate bus with multiplexed address and data lines, as shown
in Fig. 5. Note that for its basic operation, the LAPD source
only needs an output driver to drive the test signals, and the
evaluation part only needs an input driver to evaluate them.
The result evaluation can be performed in firmware. this
provides most flexibility with respect to cancelling out noise
by repeating the detection cycles; also, it is most flexible with
respect to what to do in the case of an alarm. This can be
a chip erase in the case of highly sensitive data stored on
the chip, but it can also just be a reset trigger. Just as any
security critical embedded software, this firmware should be
protected against fault attacks either by hardware or software
redundancy [20].
D. Error Compensation
Manufacturing variations as well as varying environmental
conditions lead to intersample variation of the threshold capac-
itance value that decides between “alarm” and “no alarm.”
TABLE I
QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE LAPD AGAINST OTHER
STATE-OF-THE-ART PROBING PROTECTION
In this context, the following two types of errors should be
considered.
1) Errors upon which an alarm is raised when the circuit is
in fact not being attacked. These errors are called false
positives or type I errors.
2) Errors upon which no alarm is raised when the circuit
is in fact being attacked. These errors are called false
negatives or type II errors.
These types of errors will be analyzed Section IV.
In this section, we have described the concept of an LAPD.
Its simple construction allows it to be implemented in a very
lightweight manner. The advantages of the LAPD over other
protection concepts are qualitatively summarized in Table I.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
We implemented the LAPD in a 65-nm STMicroelectronics
technology with a core voltage of 1.2 V. For the gates,
we used the low-power standard threshold voltage transistors
psvtlp and nsvtlp. Simulations were performed using
Cadence spectre 11.1 and SALVADOR [21] on a machine with
four AMD Opteron 6274 CPUs and 256-GB RAM.
A. Nominal Simulation
In a first run of nominal simulations, we assumed an
ambient temperature of 27 °C. All transistors in our design
had an aspect ratio (W/L) = 10. The intrinsic line capacitance
was assumed as CL = 100 fF. This corresponds to a line
length of approximately 1.3 mm on the top metal layer in
the technology we used, assuming an adjacent GND line with
minimum distance.
In the case that the delay elements T are implemented
as chains of two inverters, the minimum detected attack
capacitance is C∗A = 10.3 fF. For the case of four inverters,
the minimum value becomes C∗A = 23.4 fF.
B. Effects of Local Variations
As the LAPD works in differential mode, we next performed
a Monte Carlo analysis of the mismatch variations using
N = 2000 samples. Fig. 6 shows the result for the two
implementations, again with delay elements T consisting of
two and four inverters, respectively. The x-axis represents the
attack capacitance and the y axis denotes the relative frequency
of alarms. It is defined as fA(CA) = (A/N). A is the number
of Monte Carlo instances rising an alarm, as exemplarily
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Fig. 6. Relative alarm frequency for different implementations of delay
elements T (nominal transition values are dashed).
shown in Fig. 4(b), and N is the total number of Monte Carlo
simulations.
The following qualitative observations can be made from
Fig. 4.
1) The two-inverter delay implementation exhibits a
nonzero alarm frequency for CA = 0.
2) Both implementations exhibit an uncertainty region
CUA = CreliableAlarm − CreliableNoAlarm in which the
behavior of the circuit is not well predictable. This
region has an approximate size of CUA = 25 fF.
We note that state-of-the-art microprobes by the commer-
cial supplier GGB Industries can all be detected by the
four-inverter implementation. While the Picoprobe Model
18C/19C [18] is declared to have a minimum input capacitance
of 20 fF, the datasheet constrains this property to signals with
a transition time lower than 3 ns, while its input capacitance
is 60 fF for transition times below 1 ns. Further analysis
of our simulation results shows that the maximum transition
time for CA = 50 fF is smaller than 0.6 ns. The second
best microprobes with respect to input capacitance are called
Picoprobe Model 28/29 [19], which exhibit CA = 40 fF
regardless of the slew rates of the probed signals.
While the two-inverter T implementation can marginally
detect all probes according to their specification, its uncertainty
region CUA > 25 fF is still significant. The size of this region
determines both the likelihood of false positives and false neg-
atives, and hence the reliability of the circuit. As conversations
with industry representatives have suggested that reliability is
one of the most important design goals, we want to evaluate
how much the uncertainty region CUA can be narrowed by
optimizing the LAPD. For the sake of reliability, we chose the
four inverter implementation as a starting point as it does not
show a nonzero alarm rate at CA = 0.
To get a better understanding about the effects of variations,
we were first interested in how strongly the variation of each
LAPD stage affects the alarm threshold. In a first set of
simulations, we observed the variance of the delay difference
between the two latch inputs Var(tRS) at CA = 0 to quantify
this variation. It is tRS that determines the latch output
state Q, and furthermore, only few simulations are necessary
to obtain Fig. 4, as only one CA sweep point needs to be
considered.
TABLE II
VARIANCE OF TIMING DIFFERENCES AT LATCH INPUTS
OF FOUR-INVERTER IMPLEMENTATION
A technology feature allows to selectively switch OFF varia-
tions for single transistors—we used this feature to selectively
disable variations stage by stage and quantify the influence
on the variance. We captured the results of both the cases
sel = 0 and sel = 1, but we only noticed minor differences,
so our explanations are focused on the first case sel = 0 for
simplicity. The results for the four inverter implementation
of the delay element T are shown in Table II; the bold
letters in Table II refer to the gates in Fig. 3. Notice that
disabling the variations in the buffer stage Dout significantly
reduces the variance of tRS. Therefore, we assume this stage
to have the highest influence on reliability at our design point.
This is pointed out in more detail in the Appendix.
C. Reliability Metric
Prior to dimensioning the LAPD, we introduce a reliability
metric that allows us to compare the quality of different LAPD
implementations. We define this metric q as the area between
the ideal curve of an LAPD having a detection threshold C∗A
according to the definition in III-B and the curve of an actual
implementation.
This approach incorporates all tested CA points of an imple-
mentation and thus minimizes numerical noise. For reasons of
computational complexity, the boundary of this area is chosen
to be [0; Cmax]
q =
∫ C∗A
0
fA(CA)dCA +
∫ Cmax
C∗A
(1 − fA(CA))dCA (12)
with
fA
(
C∗A
) = 0.5. (13)
Equation (13) centers the threshold C∗A between the two
integrals in (12) around the intrinsic 50% alarm frequency
of a circuit. With this, the metric effectively prefers a low
uncertainty range over a predefined alarm threshold. We define
the condition fA(0) <  as an additional filter criterion to
sort out false positives. Fig. 7 illustrates the metric for the
four-inverter implementation. The plot was generated using
Matplotlib [22].
D. LAPD Dimensioning
We conducted a simple optimization on the four-inverter
implementation to estimate the minimum CA that can be
detected reliably. As shown before, variations in stage Dout
appear to have the strongest influence on the delay difference
variations. For this reason, we analyzed how much the over-
all reliability can be improved by fine-tuning the transistor
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Fig. 7. Illustration of the reliability metric of the four-inverter implementa-
tion ((q/ f F) = 4.02).
TABLE III
THRESHOLD CAPACITANCE AND RELIABILITY METRIC FOR DIFFERENT
Dout DIMENSIONS (C A = 5 fF, 200 MONTE CARLO RUNS)
dimensions of this stage. In a new series of simulations,
we performed a coarse sweep over CA as well as the aspect
ratio and the channel length to select good candidates for a
further finer analysis
W
L
∈ {10, 20, 50, 100}
L ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10} · Lmin
Lmin = 0.06μm is the minimum channel length as needed
to be specified in the simulator. The results of this set of
simulations, for which we used a step size of CA = 5 fF
and 200 Monte Carlo iterations at each point, are shown
in Table III.
The “50% alarm capacitance” C∗A, which is defined in (13),
has been estimated by linear interpolation. The best six
rows (in bold) with respect to the reliability metric have been
selected for a more detailed analysis with 2000 Monte Carlo
iterations and a step size of CA = 0.2 fF.
The results of the finer analysis are shown in Table IV;
the separated row represents the initial design, the following
lines show the results after optimization. The best case is
highlighted in bold.
TABLE IV
THRESHOLD CAPACITANCE AND RELIABILITY METRIC FOR DIFFERENT
Dout DIMENSIONS (C A = 0.2 fF, 2000 MONTE CARLO RUNS)
Fig. 8. Relative frequency of alarms of the best circuit, compared with the
initial design.
We want to use these results to estimate the real alarm
probability pA(CA) based on the absolute number of alarms A,
the number of Monte Carlo simulations N as well as the
desired confidence level α that we assume as α = 0.01.
We used the Wilson method [23] to estimate the confidence
intervals. We used these computed intervals to estimate a
“1% alarm threshold” C0.01 for which pA(C0.01) < 0.01
holds, as well as a “99% alarm threshold” C0.99 for which
pA(C0.99) > 0.99 holds.
Compared with the initial design, the quality metric of
the best case has improved by more than 40%. If we define
the uncertainty region CUA as C
U
A = C0.99 −C0.01, then the
reduction of this region is also a little more than 40%. In other
words, we have 40% more margin with respect to timing
jitter or CL imbalance, and we can also more effectively tune
the delay elements T toward a lower C∗A without increasing
the number of false positives too much.
Fig. 8 shows the curve of the optimized implementation next
to the initial design. The reduction of the uncertainty region
is also clearly visible in Fig. 8.
E. Corners
We have analyzed the behavior of the LAPD after dimen-
sioning with respect to process, voltage, and temperature
corners. The process corner points used have been SS (slow-
slow), TT (typical-typical), and FF (fast-fast); for the temper-
ature, ϑ ∈ {0 °C, 27 °C, 85 °C} were used; for the voltage,
we used VD D ∈ {1.08 V, 1.2 V, 1.32 V}.
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TABLE V
ANALYSIS OF CORNERS
The analysis of corners was used to determine the worst case
values of C0.01 and C0.99. The results are shown in Table V.
The two rows labeled “optimized” represent the corner cases
of the optimized design [(W/L) = 20 and (L/Lmin) = 2].
For reference, the values of the initial design
[(W/L) = 10, (L/Lmin) = 1] are also given.
We can see that the initial design fails to detect a 40-fF
probe in the worst case, while the optimized design has a
worst case C0.99 slightly below this value. Also, it can be
stated that the worst case C0.01 keeps away far enough from
CA = 0. The worst case uncertainty region CUA has reduced
from 34.2 to 27.4 fF, which is an improvement by about 20%.
This shows that it is possible to achieve reliable operation of
the LAPD even without dedicated optimization tools.
F. Model Fit
To verify the model stated in (10) and (11), we first
characterized the latch N to find out tH before we analyzed
the complete circuit to determine the product kDout.
We performed a sweep over tRS at the latch inputs to
estimate the minimum “hold time” tH for which the output is
reliable, that is
tRS < 0 ⇒ p(Q = 0) > 0.99 (14)
tRS > 0 ⇒ p(Q = 1) > 0.99 (15)
hold. We used N = 2000 Monte Carlo simulations and the
Wilson score interval [23] with a confidence level of α =
0.01 to estimate the bounds of tH and obtained a value of
tH = 1.40 ps. This value concentrates the mismatch variation
of the latch.
To continue the analysis, we solved (8) for
kDout =
tD + tM2 − tM1 − tRS
C ′A
(16)
and then determined the mean and variance of this value
at different C ′A sweep points by simulation of the complete
LAPD circuit; the values of tD , tM1, and tM2 were captured
as well. We then used three sigma distances from the mean
E(kDout) to estimate the reliability bounds
C∗0.01 =
tD + tM2 − tM1 − tH
E( kDout) + 3
√
Var( kDout)
(17)
C∗0.99 =
tD + tM2 − tM1 + tH
E( kDout) − 3
√
Var( kDout)
. (18)
Table VI shows the approximated threshold capacitances using
N = 2000 Monte Carlo simulations at different sweep points.
The reference values are listed in the “typical” column of
Table V. One can see that with increasing C ′A, the difference
TABLE VI
APPROXIMATED THRESHOLD CAPACITANCES
TABLE VII
AREA, TIMING, AND ENERGY COMPARISON OF CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY
SECURE SHIELDS, PAD, AND LAPD
C∗0.99 − C∗0.01 shrinks. Also, the error of C∗0.01 increases; in
absolute terms, the maximum error occurs with the initial
design at C ′A = 40 fF is C0.01 = 16.3 fF −11.2 fF = 5.1 fF.
On the other hand, an increasing C ′A also leads to a reduction
of error for the C0.99 estimation: At C ′A = 40 fF, the worst case
occurs at the optimized design at C0.99 = 32.7 fF−34.4 fF =
−1.7 fF. In relative terms, the approximation is more accurate
for C0.99 at higher values of C ′A than for C0.01 at low values
of C ′A. Therefore, it seems recommendable to focus on these
values when using the model.
The proposed linear model appears sufficient for qualitative
comparisons between different LAPD implementation variants
and helps to significantly reduce the number of required
simulations; for precise quantitative analyses, a more elaborate
model seems advisable.
G. Resource Usage
A quantitative area, timing, and energy consumption com-
parison between the cryptographically secure shields by Cio-
ranesco et al. [11], the PAD [7], and the LAPD is shown
in Table VII. All three implementations are available in
the same STMicroelectronics 65-nm technology (the PAD
implementation in this technology is currently not pub-
lished). The LAPD dimensions in terms of gate equivalents
were determined by normalizing to the sum of transistor
dimensions of the smallest size standard cell NAND gate
HS65_LS_NAND2X2. The dimensions of the cryptographi-
cally secure shields and the PAD, both after layout, were
normalized to the layout area of the same NAND gate.
It can be seen that the LAPD is one order of magnitude
smaller than the PAD and more than two orders of magnitude
smaller than the cryptographically secure shields.
The cryptographically secure shields are designed to run
continuously, while PAD and LAPD shall only be used prior
to security critical operations. For this reason, the energy
consumption of the cryptographically secure shields is given
per second. Compared with the PAD, the LAPD is faster by
a factor of 25–50. The energy consumption of the LAPD was
simulated for one test run at CA = 0. Even assuming that the
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Fig. 9. Alarm probability after majority voting.
cryptographically secure shields would, for example, only run
for 1 s, its energy consumption is larger than the one of the
LAPD by several orders of magnitude.
H. Error Compensation
We have provided error probability bounds based on sim-
ulations of the aforementioned variations. However, the com-
putational complexity of the simulations only allows us to
provide error probability bounds in the magnitude of 10−2.
Assuming the statistical independence, voting schemes can be
used to significantly improve the error probability, for example
as proposed by Parhami [24].
1) Local variations can be compensated by providing k
LAPD instances.
2) Timing jitter can be compensated by repeating the
evaluation k times.
Note that the assumption of statistical independence is not true
for global variations as well as voltage and temperature vari-
ations; however, focusing on the local variations can already
lead to a significant improvement due to the differential mode
of operation of the LAPD.
As an example, majority voting can be used as voting
scheme. In this case, k should be odd such that at least
((k + 1)/2) alarm votes are required to raise an alarm. If we
assume that the alarm probability of a single LAPD instance
evaluation at a certain operating point is pA(CA), the alarm
probability after voting follows a binomial distribution:
pkA(CA) = P
(
X ≥ k + 1
2
)
=
k∑
i= k+12
(
k
i
)
pA(CA)i
(
1 − pA(CA)
)N−i
.
This distribution shows a tendency toward its extremes
lim
k→∞ p
k
A(CA) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 pA(CA) < 0.5
0.5 pA(CA) = 0.5
1 pA(CA) > 0.5.
Assuming that an alarm for a specific CA for which
pA(CA) < 0.5 holds is called false positive, Fig. 9 allows
us to quantify the reduction of false positives. For example,
voting with k = 5 for a single-instance alarm probability,
pA(CA) = 10−2 leads to an overall alarm probability of
pkA(CA) = 10−5. Likewise, this approach also reduces false
negatives.
V. FURTHER WORK
We have shown that the LAPD is able to work reliably
using a simple manual optimization approach. As a next
step, the optimization can be improved, for example by using
gradient based optimization tools.
Also, the LAPD shall be implemented in silicon for practical
results.
Still, a desirable yet unavailable feature of the LAPD is
the ability to compensate manufacturing variations and line
length imbalances. A next generation probing detector shall
have these features.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented an LAPD that can detect the presence of
microprobes by comparing delays introduced by the capacitive
loads of bus lines to those introduced by delay elements. The
circuit only consists of a few gates and has a significantly
lower area than other protection mechanisms, such as the
PAD [7] or bus encryption.
We have analyzed the reliability of such a detector with
respect to local variations as well as process, voltage, and
temperature corners using Monte Carlo simulations on a
65-nm technology. The results of these simulations have been
used to estimate the regions of probe capacitances in which the
circuit gives reliable results. These results show that an initial
LAPD implementation can detect state-of-the-art commercial
microprobes under typical conditions, but possibly not in worst
case scenarios.
We have performed a simple optimization of the LAPD with
the goal of reducing the capacity threshold for undetectable
probes. With optimizing only one single stage of the LAPD,
the uncertainty region could be reduced by 40% under nominal
conditions as well as 20% for the corners. After optimization,
the previously mentioned microprobes can also be detected in
the worst case scenario.
APPENDIX
The LAPD principle of operation is based on the detec-
tion of the delay difference (tRS) arriving at the RS latch
inputs (the arbiter). The transitions arriving at the latch are
delayed by chains d1 and d2 and tD and tD being switched
during the two operating cycles in each one of the chains.
Process variations alter the propagating delay of these three
chains in such a way that the magnitude of tRS becomes
unstable at a certain degree and therefore less predictable.
These effects cannot be avoided completely but diminished
at a certain degree as it is seen in Section IV-D. In particular,
after a first assessment, it is observed that inverter Dout has a
significantly larger influence on the variability than the rest of
stages and therefore the optimization is further concentrated
on this inverter.
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Fig. 10. Input/output slew-rates and delay of an inverter.
To understand why inverter Dout has a larger influence
on the variability than the rest of stages, we can focus on
the delay propagating model of a single inverter that was
presented by Shoji [25], and is summarized in the following
paragraphs.
In Fig. 10, a simple inverter is shown with the corresponding
input/output transitions. Input/output slew rates (V s−1) are
αI and αO , respectively. The delay of the gate is calculated
at 50% of the signal levels and is symbolized by TO I .
Internally, the pMOS and nMOS transistors have transcon-
ductances (A V−1) that are represented by bN and bP ,
respectively, and have a big contribution to the switching speed
of the output, together with the load capacitance.
Now, we will analyze the two possible scenarios in which
the variability can disturb the propagating delay.
A. Inverter Delay Is Independent of the Input Slew-Rate
Intuitively, we know that if the input slew-rate is extremely
fast (αI → ∞), the propagating delay (TO I → t∞) will exclu-
sively depend on the inverter load capacitance and the (dis-)
charging transistor transconductance, bN for the case in
Fig. 10. In each inverter, the delay be affected by the variations
of the (dis-)charging transistor transconductance and the load
capacitance dimensions (typically the input of the next stage).
These two elements will generate variability in the propagating
delay (t∞), but it will be independent of the input slew-rate
variability produced by the previous stage. Therefore, the total
delay variability of a chain of inverters will be the sum of
the independent variabilities of each inverter stage, and it will
typically become a normal random distributed variable whose
variance will be the sum of the variances of each inverter
delay.
This scenario is the most favorable in terms of reducing
the effects of process variabilities. Minimizing tactics are
fundamentally based on placing strategies and enlarging the
dimensions of transistors in order to reduce the percentage of
the variability over the total physical dimensions. However,
this is at the cost of more area and is only partially applied
until the range of the circuit tolerance is achieved.
B. Inverter Delay Is Dependent of the Input Slew-Rate
When the input slew-rate (αI ) is significantly smaller than
the output slew-rate (αO ), the delay of gate (TO I ) becomes
sensitive to it too. Particularly, the degree of sensitivity fol-
lows a hyperbolic function whose growing degree depends
on the ratio between pMOS and nMOS transconductances.
Therefore, if we consider the previous inverter controlling
the input slew-rate, its variability will propagate to the next
inverter through the variability in the slew-rate, and at the same
time, it will affect the next stage delay with a contribution
much stronger than the simpler addition seen in our previous
scenario.
In the LAPD circuit in Fig. 3, this effect is clearly observed
in the inverter Dout, because it receives the input from heavily
loaded bus-lines, and the output drives smaller gates like the
internal delay chain T and the multiplexer M.
The reduction of the variability effects in this scenario is
achieved by doing a proper balance of the pMOS and nMOS
transconductances as it will be clear from the Shoji delay
model presented in the following.
C. Delay Model Under Variable Input Slew-Rate Conditions
Let us first define the transconductance ratio β = bN/bP ,
the normalized input slew-rate Sl = αI /αO , and the normal-
ized inverter delay Tinv = TO I /t∞.
According to Shoji [25], the delay can be approximated by
the following closed expressions if the transistor models are
linearized and fixed to a zero threshold voltage
Tinv = 1 + 12(1 + β)
1
Sl
; Sl ≥ β2(1 + β)
Tinv = 2
√
β
2(1 + β)
1
Sl
+ 1 − β
2(1 + β)
1
Sl
; Sl < β2(1 + β) .
(19)
Interestingly, for more realistic transistor models (including
nonzero threshold voltages), Shoji shows that the dependence
of Tinv from Sl will follow the same law despite a closed
expression could not be found.
Equation (19) is plotted in Fig. 11. At the x-axis,
the normalized input slew-rate is fixed and it has two main
regions (separated by a dotted line): larger and smaller than 1.
For values larger than 1, the input transition is faster than the
output, while for values smaller than 1, the input transition
becomes slower than the output one. At the y-axis, the normal-
ized delay is presented. When it is 1, the delay of the inverter
is exactly t∞ and is equal to the delay when the inverter input
switches very fast. Each one of the curves represents a different
β ratio going from 0.25 to 4.
When Sl is higher than 1, all the curves closely coincide and
are almost equal to 1. This shows that the delay of the inverter
is almost independent of the input slew-rate Sl and that the
transconductance ratio β does not have any importance with
respect to the process variations.
When Sl is smaller than one, curves diverge and thus the
sensitivity of the inverter delay becomes stronger to the input
slew-rate Sl . This is clearly seen in the curve β = 0.25,
that for a variation of Sl from 0.05 to 0.042 (a relative
change of 13%), the normalized inverter delay changes from
6 to 8 approximately (a relative change of 29%). This strong
dependence can be reduced by tuning the β ratio at the
proper value. In the plot, a dotted rectangle indicates the
region of the best design. The transconductance ratio should
be adjusted such that the normalized delay is kept inside this
region.
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Fig. 11. Variation of the normalized inverter delay as a function of the normalized input slew-rate [25].
While this process cannot be done analytically, given the
complexity of the transistor models, simulations can be used to
find the best transconductance ratio β, i.e., like for the critical
inverter Dout.
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